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The recently established presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are seeking 
to implement governmental agendas that represent a policy shift with respect 
to previous administrations. However, in doing so, they face political and so-
cial constraints. Executive politics – that is, the presidential approach to the 
design of the highest executive agencies and appointment strategies – stands 
out as a tool to improve presidential leeway and coordination capacity.
 • Since late 2015 the Latin American left has faced setbacks due to the election of 
President Mauricio Macri of Argentina and President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of 
Peru, as well as former vice president Michel Temer’s assumption of power in 
Brazil after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. 
 • In Argentina and Peru these power shifts in the presidency were accompanied 
by minority support in Congress. In Brazil, in contrast, Temer built a large co-
alition in Congress, albeit within a highly polarised political and social context 
that threatens its cohesiveness and survival.  
 • To face congressional oppositions, attentive publics, and organised social sec-
tors that seek to hinder their policy goals, Latin American presidents need to 
use their important constitutional policymaking powers – as well as their pre-
rogatives to appoint officials and to design the executive’s upper-level structure 
– wisely and strategically. 
 • The three presidents have established smaller institutional presidencies than 
their predecessors – that is, they have reduced their core structure of close aids 
and supports. At the same time, they have given more power to the cabinet 
ministers, as well as to the cabinet coordination units, with the goal of aligning 
the executive with the president’s policy preferences.
Policy Implications
The constitutional powers that presidents have to conduct the policymaking 
process, particularly in Congress, are important governing tools, but executive 
politics represents an equally crucial strategy. Presidents use changes to the ex-
ecutive’s design and political appointments to influence the creation of policies 
and achieve their policy goals. These are important (although often neglected) 
presidential tools, particularly when presidents are dealing with reform  agendas 
within constraining political environments.
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Political Shifts in Latin America
Since 17 May, when a new corruption scandal erupted in Brazil, the instability of the 
current president, Michael Temer, has acquired a dramatic tone. The political con-
text has worsened, and a decision by the top electoral court at the beginning of June 
was seen as the opportunity to remove the president. However, the court eventually 
rejected the nullification (cassação) of the Dilma-Temer ticket with a tight vote, 
thereby dismissing the accusations of campaign finance violations. Since then, the 
calls demanding Temer’s resignation have not subsided, two parties have left the 
governing coalition, and street protests aiming to end the presidential agenda in 
Congress have increased. For the time being, the president has insisted on remain-
ing in power, but four of his five special advisors have abandoned the presidential 
office in the face of corruption accusations. 
The latest events in Brazil involve Temer directly and may cement the end of 
the presidency. But he has actually governed under a cloud of scandals and dismal 
approval ratings since assuming power about a year ago. With an ambitious re-
form agenda, his government, together with recently established governments in 
Argentina and Peru, represented an ideological shift in the region from left-wing 
populism to the centre right. In effect, Vice President Temer of the Brazilian Demo-
cratic Movement Party (PMDB) assumed power at the end of August 2016, after the 
Brazilian Congress had impeached President Dilma Rousseff of the Partido dos Tra-
balhadores (PT), which had held the presidency for almost four consecutive terms 
since 2003. In Argentina, Mauricio Macri from the Alliance Cambiemos assumed 
the presidency in December 2015 and thus put an end to 12 years of rule by Néstor 
and Cristina Kirchner (from the Alliance Frente para la Victoria, FpV). In July 2016, 
Peruvian voters elected a centre-right technocrat, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, after the 
five-year presidency of Ollanta Humala, a politician with a military background who 
admittedly only briefly carried the left-wing label, as the policies and decisions he 
adopted after assuming power showed continuity with the market-friendly model 
that has prevailed in Peru in recent decades. 
Although these three presidents had campaigned for new directions in govern-
ment policies prior to taking office – even Temer signalled them in the PMDB mani-
festo released alongside the impeachment crisis – policy shifts are a hard task for 
presidents who have not received a clear majority mandate. In effect, the executive 
power shifts in Argentina and Peru were achieved in narrow run-off elections, and 
were accompanied by minority support in Congress. Temer built a large legislative 
coalition, but the highly polarised process that led him to the presidency and, as 
shown above, ongoing political and economic crises have damaged his already nar-
row social support and are threatening the coalition’s survival. These presidents 
need to make choices with redistributive consequences, while surrounded by dis-
trustful or even hostile legislative parties, bureaucracies, and voters. In the presi-
dential systems of Latin America, the extent of change a government may be able to 
implement depends not only on the set of ideas coming with the new president, but 
also on the amount of resources he/she is able to mobilise to support these ideas. 
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Presidents and Presidencies
Latin American presidents enjoy significant policymaking powers in multiple policy 
realms, giving them a means to influence the legislative agenda – for example, the 
power to introduce and veto legislation – and, in many cases, the power to legis-
late by decrees with the force of laws. Further, presidents preside over the execu-
tive branch, and have prerogatives to appoint and dismiss thousands of different 
government officials. Thus, Latin American presidents are directly elected, consti-
tutionally strong, and potentially powerful individuals who lead the policymaking 
process. However, in recent years the scholarly literature has called attention to 
the institutional – rather than the individual – dimension of the presidency. First, 
interesting research on cabinet politics has shown not only that presidents arrange 
their governments according to their own calculus, but also that such arrangements 
usually take into account the challenges and constraints posed by critical junctures 
and by the availability of political resources in Congress. Multiparty cabinets, for 
example, reflect a fragmented Congress and are an attempt to form a presiden-
tial legislative majority. Second, recent works (such as ours) highlight the fact that 
presidents do not take decisions alone, but rather count on the support of a cadre 
of technical assistants, trusted advisors, and government agencies operating under 
their direct authority (Inácio and Llanos 2015, 2016). We call these agencies, which 
are part of the executive branch but are not located within the executive cabinet, the 
institutional presidency (in the following, the IP). 
Our research on Latin American cases has also highlighted the ebb and flow 
of the size and role of the IP. We have shown that presidents heading multiparty 
cabinets – typical in Brazil, for instance – are more likely to centralise decisions and 
governing tasks in the hands of the presidential staff. That is, under their rule the IP 
is expected to grow. Similarly, we have seen that the IP grows under presidents pur-
suing reform agendas, especially structural reforms. We assume that those presi-
dents require the strengthening of advisory and coordination structures under their 
authority much more than presidents who preside over cabinets where only one 
party is sitting and/or who do not have ambitious reform agendas. Thus, changes 
to the executive structure are used strategically and add to the toolbox that presi-
dents have to exercise their governing tasks, to improve their stance vis-à-vis other 
institutions and actors, and to shape the pace and fate of their policy programmes. 
Constraining Political Environments
How far presidents go in the implementation of reforms depends not only on the 
content of their agendas, but also on the opportunities other actors have to veto 
them. These constraining actors can be part of either the institutional setting or the 
broader context where presidents act. Sometimes presidents can compensate for 
the lack of resources in one area with the resources available in others. 
In presidential systems, a government’s minority status makes presidential 
success in Congress harder to achieve, but even in the case of governments with 
majorities in Congress, other institutional traits may also complicate the political 
scene. The bicameral legislatures, federative structures, and decentralised judici-
aries of Argentina and Brazil provide plenty of veto opportunities for the political 
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opposition. Midterm elections, such as those scheduled to take place in Argentina 
in October 2017, create pressure for short-term policy results and hinder inter-par-
ty cooperation in Congress. Even in the case of more centralised systems, such as 
Peru’s unitary structure and unicameral parliament, other mechanisms can poten-
tially weaken the government – for instance, the cabinet confidence vote. 
Kuczynski became the president of Peru after winning the run-off election with 
50.1 per cent against Keiko Fujimori, with a lead of less than 40,000 votes (a differ-
ence of 0.24 per cent). Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular obtained two-thirds of the seats 
in the unicameral legislature of 130 members, while the president’s party only won 
18 seats. Kuczynski then became the chief executive, but Fujimori retained the un-
disputed leadership of the legislature. Mauricio Macri’s presidential victory in Ar-
gentina was also narrow. Macri won 51.4 per cent of the vote in the run-off election 
against Scioli, the candidate of the ruling FpV, with a lead of just over 700,000 votes 
(a difference of 2.68 per cent). The electoral results for Congress did not favour 
Macri in either of the chambers. He could count on the fact that Peronism usually 
fragments while in opposition, but deals would be unavoidable to pass legislation, 
as in the Peruvian case, and blockages were hence foreseeable. In Brazil, presidents 
form and preside over broad coalitions to ensure governability. Michel Temer had 
run as the vice presidential candidate, together with Dilma Rousseff of the Workers 
Party (PT), in the presidential contest of 2014. Despite assuming power in the ex-
tremely polarised context that surrounded Rousseff’s impeachment, Temer built a 
large coalition and managed to command the most favourable situation in Congress 
of all three presidents, until the above-mentioned crisis erupted in May. Initially, 
his government coalition included 11 parties and controlled 69 per cent and 77 per 
cent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, respectively. Seven of the 
parties had left Rousseff’s government on the eve of the impeachment decision and 
had voted for her removal. Four other parties came from opposition lines. One co-
alition newcomer, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), had been defeated 
in the 2014 presidential run-off election and had questioned the electoral results 
by suing the Dilma-Temer ticket before the electoral court on grounds of economic 
abuse. Paradoxically, this party was a government member when the electoral court 
recently decided against this challenge, and Aecio Neves, its then presidential can-
didate, is currently facing judicial investigation himself. His PSDB party has still 
not left the government, but it has become increasingly critical of Temer. 
Since the policy shifts pushed by these presidents depend on large pro-reform, if not 
national, coalitions, the moods of other veto players matter. Governors are powerful 
actors in Argentina as they may exert control over congressional votes and street con-
President/
Party
Electoral Support 
(votes %) 
Chamber of Deputies 
(seats %) 
Senate
(seats %) 
1st
round
2nd
round
Margin
of
victory*
Presi- 
dent’s
party 
Other 
govern-
ing
parties 
Total Presi- 
dent’s
party 
Other 
govern- 
ing
parties 
Total
Macri/ 
PRO 34.2 51.3 2.68 16.3 17.5 33.9 8.3 15.3 23.6 
Kuczynski/ 
PPK
21.1 50.1 0.24 13.1 0.0 13.1 - - - 
Temer/
PMDB
- - - 12.9 56.1 69.0 23.5 53.1 76.6 
 
Table 1.  
Electoral and Parlia-
mentary Support
Note: PRO: Repub-
lican Proposal; PPK: 
Peruvians for Change.
* Difference in votes 
from the second-place 
candidate in run-off 
election. 
Source: Authors’ 
elaboration.
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flicts. The alliance Cambiemos that took 
Macri to power won just five provinces out 
of 24, but Macri’s party (PRO) obtained 
the governorship of two crucial districts: 
the province of Buenos Aires and the au-
tonomous city of Buenos Aires. Although 
financial necessity trumps political affin ity 
and governors depend on federal govern-
ment assistance, the unfavourable distri-
bution of territorial power foreshadowed 
potential conflict that would require con-
siderable negotiation effort on the part 
of the national executive. In Brazil, Te-
mer’s PMDB, the most nationalised party, 
controlled 25 per cent of governorships 
when the president assumed power and 
obtained the largest share of mayors (19 
per cent) in the municipal elections that 
took place in 2016. However, the fiscal 
reforms proposed by Temer include fed-
erative bargains related to the spending 
of subnational governments. Pressure for 
fiscal equilibrium measures coming from 
the federal executive may threaten the po-
litical support of the PMDB’s governors 
and mayors for these reforms. Anticipat-
ing this kind of federative conflict, Temer 
avoided attaching changes to the state and 
municipal pension systems to the pro-
posed reform of the federal pension system.
Other extra-institutional factors, such as the public mood and economic indi-
cators, can hurt presidential leverage and make it likely that more legislators will 
cross the floor. Particularly the two minority governments in Argentina and Peru 
are extremely attentive to variations in the state of public opinion. In Brazil re-
cent polls have indicated a less negative perception around the economic situation, 
but Temer’s popularity had reached single digits even before the political situation 
worsened for the government in May.
Constraining scenarios present several challenges to presidents trying to push 
forward the reversal of previous policy agendas. They are particularly challenging 
where policy shifts focus on cuts in government expenditures, as is the case in Ar-
gentina and Brazil. In fact, it is not easy to pursue unpopular measures in the face 
of an attentive public and organised sectors and groups, and even more difficult if 
the president is unpopular. The situation demands a governmental capacity to an-
ticipate political and institutional reactions, a sense of timing, context-sensitivity to 
calibrate reform bills, and the management of the executive tools to build winning 
coalitions.
Figure 1.  
Popularity and  
GDP Growth
Source: Authors’ 
elaboration based on the 
following data sources: 
Argentina: Management 
& Fit (2017); Brazil: 
IBGE/SCN 2010 (2017), 
Pesquisa CNI-IBOPE 
(2017); Peru: INEI 
(2017), CPI (2017).
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Presidents, Cabinets, and Presidencies
In defining the executive structure, presidents seek to achieve several goals. Table 2 
summarises the executive politics of the three new presidents. On the left side, it 
shows the ministerial composition, whether single party or multiparty. Seeking to 
forge a strong legislative coalition, Temer adopted a highly partisan cabinet and 
shared portfolio positions among party allies, nominating a few non-partisan min-
isters. Macri and Kuczynski also used ministerial positions to foster political sup-
port, but they did not go further than including the parties of the electoral alliance. 
Macri’s party predominates over coalition partners and non-partisan ministers in 
the cabinet. His ministers demonstrate political experience and technical expertise. 
More markedly, Kuczynski opted for a cabinet predominantly made up of non-par-
tisan technocrats, although some of them have had previous political government 
experience.
On the right side, the table reports on the executive agencies. They are grouped ac-
cording to three areas: the number of ministries and the number of units located 
directly under the presidential authority (the IP or presidential office), and whether 
or not there is a cabinet coordination office. The ministries are policy units par 
excellence, while the units of the IP have historically had different functions. They 
are mainly meant to provide administrative support to the president and other core 
managerial functions, but have also included advisory tasks and policy implementa-
tion (Inácio 2012; Inácio and Llanos 2015). The three executives under study vary 
in terms of the number and type of units that compose the three areas of the ex-
ecutive structure. Some of these variations already begin in the constitutional text. 
The Argentine and Peruvian constitutions establish the Jefatura of the Ministers’ 
Cabinet (JGM) and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (PGM), respectively, 
which are defined as institutions responsible for cabinet coordination, among other 
administrative and managerial tasks. Interestingly, the two institutions have been 
growing in both countries for some time, and their tasks have expanded even to 
entail policy-oriented functions. 
Changes to the Executive Structure   
Brazil. Of the three presidents, Temer is the one who has gone the furthest in re-
defining the executive in the two areas that it comprises in Brazil, the cabinet and 
the IP. The most remarkable move was a reduction of units in both areas, but other 
President/
Party
Cabinet composition and minister turnover * Executive structure ** 
Presi- 
dent’s
party 
Other 
parties 
Non-
partisan 
Minister
dismissals Ministries
Presi- 
dential 
units
(IP)
Cabinet 
coordi-
nation 
ministry
(JGM/
PGM) 
Macri/ 
PRO 12 6 4 2 22 5 1 
Kuczynski/ 
PPK
1 1 16 4 18 - 1 
Temer/
PMDB
9 17 4 10 22 4 - 
 
Table 2.  
Cabinet Design and 
Executive Structure
* Composition in June 
2017.  ** IP: We count 
the highest agencies in 
the executive structure, 
those located directly be-
low the president; JGM 
and PGM: the cabinet 
coordination structures 
for Argentina and Peru, 
respectively.
Source: Authors’ 
elaboration. 
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decisions are also noteworthy. Regarding the cabinet, given the large number of 
parties (11), we would have expected an increase in the number of ministries, but a 
large cabinet was a trait of the expansionist PT governments, and Temer wanted to 
signal a change in managerial orientation as well as a commitment to economic re-
forms. He therefore reduced the number of cabinet positions, a move which turned 
out to be more modest than announced, from 32 to 28 positions. In addition, the 
president returned to the cabinet ministries that had been centralised in the IP dur-
ing the PT’s administrations. In our view, this move enhanced the value of cabinet 
positions for coalition partners and can be seen as a strategy to keep the oversized 
coalition together. It is a move similar to that of Itamar Franco (1992–1995), the 
other Brazilian post-impeachment president, who also reinforced the ministerial 
portfolios. Temer’s ministerial changes were qualitatively noteworthy and contro-
versial, and they sometimes needed to be reversed because of the opposition they 
raised – as in the case of the merging of the ministries of culture and education or 
the closing down of the Ministry of Agrarian Development. [1] Regarding the IP, its 
reduction and restructuring was no less contentious than the cabinet’s. As already 
noted, several of those presidential units, mostly policy units, were decentralised 
to ministries. [2] The IP basically maintained advisory and coordination tasks, with 
the latter assigned to the Casa Civil – now in charge of the government’s public 
image – and the Secretariat of Government, which pursue inter-ministerial and 
inter-branch articulation. Only one policy unit was left as part of the presidential 
office: the Investment Partnership Program (PPI), which fosters infrastructure and 
concessions projects and is headed by PMDB’s leader, who is loyal to the president. 
Argentina. There are three well-defined areas within the Argentine executive: the 
institutional presidency, the cabinet, and the Jefatura of the Ministers’ Cabinet. 
Although many structural changes have taken place in these areas over the last 
year, Macri has not altered longer-term tendencies: the size of the cabinet and the 
JGM have been growing in the last 15 years, while the IP has been simultaneously 
contracting. Under Macri, cabinet growth and unit relocation have mainly target-
ed policy priorities and implementation strategies. The cabinet grew from 17 to 21 
ministries when Macri assumed power, and a late reshuffle divided the Ministry of 
Economy into two, all of which increased the number of ministries to 22. Driven by 
a demanding economic context, Macri has opted for an “economic cabinet” rather 
than for a single super-minister of economy. This “cabinet” is composed of approxi-
mately six ministries and the president of the Central Bank, and it is staffed with 
pro-market and entrepreneurial figures. The idea is that a collegial approach to-
wards the economy provides the functional specialisation to tackle problems with 
concrete diagnoses and methodologies. However, some argue that the persistence 
of economic problems is due to the lack of a centralised direction; in any case, this 
decentralised approach enhances the cabinet’s coordination needs. Coordination 
has been entrusted to the chief of cabinet, Marcos Peña, Macri’s right hand and an 
active member of PRO since its founding. The coordination functions of the JGM, 
which Peña presides over, have been strengthened through the Secretariat of Inter-
ministerial Coordination and the Secretariat of Public Policy Coordination, as well 
as through the central role given to their appointees, two CEOs with very close links 
to the chief of cabinet. The two appointees carry out the managerial tasks of policy 
coordination, leaving the political articulation and public communication of policy 
1 The artistic and cultural 
industry sectors, scientists, 
minorities, housing, and 
landless movements re-
acted strongly to the extinc-
tion or merging of ministries 
corresponding to these 
policy areas. These critical 
reactions forced reversals: 
the Ministry of Culture was 
recreated 11 days after it 
was shut down, and the 
Ministry of Human Rights 
was re-established after 
eight months of having 
been downgraded to the 
level of a secretariat.
2 Such as those related to 
promotion of human rights, 
women’s rights, and race 
equality – a showcase of 
PT administrations – which 
were transferred to the 
Ministry of Justice, trigger-
ing strong criticism from 
social movements and 
leftist parties.
   8    GIGA FOCUS | LATIN AMERICA | NO. 4 | JULY 2017 
to the chief of cabinet. Macri’s IP area has a structure of five units, within which the 
traditional General Secretariat and the Legal Secretariat, both with cabinet rank, 
stand out as the presidential administrative supports. Despite three other units, 
two with a policy character and one with an advisory character, being maintained 
within the presidency, this area has had previous units decentralised to the cabinet 
or placed under the General Secretariat, which has sharpened its scope of action by 
concentrating on the administrative tasks of presidential support.   
Peru. Kuczynski maintained a cabinet design of 18 ministerial portfolios in addition 
to the PGM position, but he signalled that future changes could be made to this 
structure. In Peru, coordination and policy tasks are conducted by the PGM, while 
the IP mostly deals with the administrative and technical tasks of providing support 
for the president and is formally attached to the PGM. President Kuczynski kept 
the size of the IP but rearranged its structure: an Advisory Committee was created 
to instruct the president on priority policy areas; this arrangement increased his 
leverage to nominate experts directly subordinate to him. The Press Secretariat was 
redesigned as a new unit in charge of the administration’s strategic communication 
and institutional image. The only policy-oriented unit within the IP was shut down. 
Together, these changes confirmed the IP as an administrative area for the presi-
dent and strengthened the coordinating function of the PGM within the govern-
ment. Regarding the cabinet, Kuczynski strategically formed a technocratic cabinet 
composed of experts and business people, though they had previous government 
experience. The most significant choice was Fernado Zavala as head of the PGM. He 
had accompanied Kuczynski during previous tenures as minister and PGM head. 
Responsible for coordinating the cabinet, Zavala was seen as a tentative bridge for 
dialogue because he was reported to have good relations with the opposition party 
Fuerza Popular. The cabinet obtained the Congress’s vote of confidence in August 
2016 with 121 votes, against only two votes and one abstention.
Appointments 
Executive politics includes both structural changes and appointments. The profile 
of those in charge in every area is a signal for political and economic agents on 
expected policy content and on the quality of government performance. Within the 
cabinet area, the ministerial dismissals that have been taking place can be regarded 
as normal political adjustments in Argentina, where the economy still does not per-
form successfully. In Peru, they show the tight control that an opposition-domi-
nated Congress exerts over the ministers through the threat of censure. In Brazil, 
we see the highest level of cabinet instability: 10 ministers have left since Temer 
assumed power about a year ago, mostly due to scandals that have emerged during 
the ongoing corruption investigations led by the judiciary and the public prosecu-
tion. However, the government has managed to insulate the economic team from 
this sequence of tumultuous events since it took power, seeking to avoid sealing the 
fate of the reforms to that of the president.
Within each institutional presidency – that is, within the agencies that are clos-
est to the president – the presidents of these three countries are governing with 
people they trust, who have different profiles. Temer has concentrated coordination 
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tasks in the hands of professional politicians who, despite their ministerial and par-
liamentary backgrounds, stand out for being personally close to the president. This 
approach to the presidency’s staff is not showing the expected results. It resem-
bles a “politicisation” strategy (Moe 1985; Rudalevige and Lewis 2005) because the 
president has chosen people mostly due to personal linkages and trust. A low level 
of coordination prevails as well and has worsened the government’s capacity to an-
ticipate parties’ and voters’ reaction to reforms. Temer has done little to overcome 
this problem, other than sharing the Ministry of Coordination with another coali-
tion partner (PSDB) after a scandal triggered the resignation of the then minister (a 
close presidential aide) at the beginning of 2017.  
Macri’s smaller presidency shows his preference for direct proximity to a few 
people whom he trusts absolutely. The secretary general, the legal secretary, and 
the chief of advisors to the president are the president’s lifelong friends or close 
collaborators within the PRO party. There are some key advisors outside the formal 
hierarchy, but the most important figures and close collaborators from his party oc-
cupy institutional positions within the executive and beyond – notably, the above-
mentioned chief of cabinet, the vice president, the president of the Senate, and the 
president of the Chamber of Deputies. Although many of Macri’s collaborators were 
previously corporate CEOs and have an entrepreneurial background, most also ac-
companied him when he was the mayor of Buenos Aires. Therefore, the political 
component is strong as well.
Kuczynski’s presidential staffing strategies are in line with his selection of a 
non-partisan cabinet. Policy experts and corporate CEOs have been appointed 
to higher positions within the institutional presidency or Despacho Presidential, 
mainly as special advisors to the president in particular areas, such as foreign policy 
and security. Some of these advisors have been appointed to honorary positions, 
an innovation intended to make renowned policymakers and technocrats improve 
the informational decision-making environment of the president in strategic areas. 
However, a scandal has led to calls for the turnover of these advisors and frustrated 
the president’s move to forge a technocratic pro-reform alliance at the highest level 
of political command. 
Assessment
We have observed that the three presidents converge in heading smaller institution-
al presidencies than their predecessors, while they have simultaneously enlarged 
or empowered the other executive structures – that is, the ministries – and, in Ar-
gentina and Peru, the cabinet coordination area. Despite their apparent similarities 
in terms of policy orientation, the three presidents face an unequal combination of 
challenges and goals. Temer is the president with the lowest popularity and the only 
one leading a (increasingly unstable) majority multiparty coalition in Congress, in 
the country with the most profound economic, and now political, crisis. Before the 
latest scandal in May the president had diverted significant attention to the con-
gressional arena, where he used his agenda-setting power to control the content 
and timing of the reforms, while at the same time disregarding the redistributive 
consequences of his policies and their effect on groups with a high mobilisation 
capacity. Macri and Kuczynski’s minority status exposes them to inter-branch con-
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flicts, but a less critical economic situation in each country has given these presi-
dents more space for cross-party negotiations and for the strategic management of 
reform timing. In particular, Kuczynski’s budget proposal opted for an incremental 
reduction of the fiscal deficit in order to avoid immediate restrictive fiscal meas-
ures. This gradualist approach to reform derives from a relatively better economic 
context as well as a cautious reading of the minority situation and the shortage of 
institutional resources. 
The staffing concept of the three cabinets differs, but they are all seeking co-
hesiveness to support the reform agendas. This is a point in common between the 
ideologically homogeneous coalition headed by Temer, Kuczynski’s technocratic 
cabinet, and Macri’s PRO-dominated cabinet. They each show considerable cabi-
net alignment per se with the reforms in progress. Given this composition, intra-
cabinet conflicts are less demanding for these presidents than external challenges, 
which renders changes to the executive’s structure less significant than managing 
and coordinating strategies. Cabinet alignment and policy-coherent goals have also 
been pursued through the reallocation of administrative power and competences 
between the cabinet and the IP and, in Argentina, through the enhanced coordinat-
ing role of the JGM. 
Even though the reform agendas of Macri, Temer, and Kuczynski have been 
making progress through the use of these executive politics tools, such presidential 
choices are not without cost and entail risks: (a) The enlargement or empowerment 
of the cabinet units, in the absence of a coordination centre, may open up space for 
contradictory policy goals that could eventually hinder economic reform. (b) The ap-
pointment of an inner circle of trusted personnel entails politicisation risks, which 
may obstruct the flow of information that presidents need to take decisions, their 
ability to balance distinct worldviews, and thus the government’s capacity to be re-
sponsive to voter and stakeholder expectations. (c) Given the need for constitutional 
and legal changes to back policy shifts, these presidents have prioritised executive–
Congress negotiations. This is crucial for policy approval, but it may also involve 
compromising the scope of the policies, and render enforcement mechanisms less 
effective.  
In short, through the description of the executive politics under Macri, Kuczyn-
ski and Temer, we have called attention to how presidents use this strategic tool in 
practice. Under strong constraints and pushing for policy shifts, these presidents 
have shown similarities in terms of the staffing and design of their executives. The 
redesign of the institutional presidency is still available as an alternative means to 
enhance the executive’s coordination capacity and thereby enable the successful 
implementation of reforms. 
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